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Abstract 
Argentina is a federal republic located in South 
America. Despite Argentina’s redemocratization in 
1983, conditions favoring human rights abuses still 
persist. Institutional violence refers to structured 
practices of human rights violation by state officials 
belonging to public institutions. In this paper, we 
outline and discuss privacy issues in institutional 
violence complaints in Argentina. To this aim, we 
defined a BPMN process model for registering victims’ 
complaints in a database, and proposed an approach 
to investigate the privacy of such process from a threat 
modeling perspective. With the approach, we identified 
privacy threats of information disclosure and content 
unawareness, and defined privacy requirements and 
controls needed to mitigate these threats. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Argentina is a federal republic member of the G-20 
world's largest economies and is second in size and 
third in population in South America. It is a federation 
of twenty-three provinces and one autonomous city, 
Buenos Aires. Provinces hold all the power they chose 
not to delegate to the federal government. They must 
be representative republics in compliance with the 
Federal Constitution. 
Despite Argentina’s redemocratization in 1983, 
conditions favoring human rights abuses still persist 
[1]. Specific human rights abuses (e.g., torture, 
disappearances, and murder) that resemble practices 
common under dictatorship's state terrorism (1976 to 
1983) continue to take place [1]. The law prohibits 
torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment and provides penalties for it.  
In 2012, the National Registry of Cases of Torture 
and/or Maltreatment (NRCT) attempted to comply 
with international human right treatments. The NRCT 
encourages the operational implementation of the 
optional protocol to the convention against torture and 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment [8]. For this, concrete cases of violation of 
rights and torture are registered through regular visits 
to confinement places, and by spontaneous 
communications of victims and their relatives to the 
Office of Procurator and Commissioner. 
As a result, the Criminal Court of Cassation’s 
Office in Buenos Aires reported that there were 265 
complaints of torture and mistreatment by law 
enforcement officers during arrest or institutional 
confinement from January to April 2015. On the other 
hand, the Office of Public Defenders in the province of 
Santa Fe reported 180 complaints from December 2014 
to September 2015 [2]. 
Institutional violence refers to structured practices 
of human rights violation by state officials belonging 
to public institutions such as security forces, armed 
forces, prison services and health effectors in contexts 
of restriction of autonomy and/or liberty, e.g., arrests, 
imprisonments, custodies, cares, hospitalizations, etc. 
Since complaints may individualize abusers (e.g., 
police officers), some victims express reluctance to 
make judicial complaints because of their fear of 
physical, mental and access rights reprisals adopted by 
state officials after each complaint.  
In this context, protecting privacy of victims’ 
complaints is an imperative concern. Hung and Cheng 
[4] define information privacy as “an individual’s right 
to determine how, when, and to what extent 
information about the self will be released to another 
person or to an organization.” Privacy rules can be 
achieved through privacy preserving mechanisms such 
as encryption and access control. In this work, we 
outline and discuss privacy issues in institutional 
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violence complaints in Argentina. To this aim, we 
defined a BPMN (Business Process Model and 
Notation) [19] process model for registering victims’ 
complaints in a database, and proposed an approach to 
investigate the privacy of such process from a threat 
modeling perspective. The approach was adapted from 
Microsoft’s Threat Modeling Principles [12] and 
STRIDE Model [13], and the LINDDUN methodology 
[17]. By applying the approach, we identified privacy 
threats and defined privacy requirements and controls 
needed to mitigate these threats. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
provides a literature review. Section 3 presents the 
procedure for surveying institutional violence 
complaints in Argentina. Section 4 presents privacy 
threat assessment. Section 5 provides a study on 
privacy threats. Section 6 concludes the paper and 
presents future work. 
 
2. Related work 
 
There are a number of related research works in 
this area. For example, Debnath et al. [15] conceptually 
designed the IT support for human rights watching, 
police transparency and police performance evaluation 
in the province of Chubut, Argentina. To this aim, they 
proposed a web application, which tracks and records 
Police Station activities and provide citizens the 
opportunity to evaluate Police performance, and hence 
it can be used as human rights watching tool.  
Van den Braak et al. [14] proposed a framework to 
support secure data integration and sharing for 
interorganizational collaboration in the public sector. It 
requires a trusted third party that manages access 
control to personal information and helps protect the 
privacy of parties. This framework could be useful for 
the exchange of data between the NRCT and other 
public organizations or NGOs, but for the tasks of data 
collection and registration of cases of torture, it is 
necessary to include other security and privacy 
methods from the inside. Van Veenstra et al. [25] 
found that the main threats to information security and 
privacy in several public organizations in the 
Netherlands came from the inside. For instance, 
“employees of organizations sometimes accessed 
information that they did not need in order to perform 
their tasks, such as information concerning celebrities”. 
Zuiderwijk et al. [10] presented guidelines for 
identifying issues for opening up governmental judicial 
research data. Guidelines were determined by 
investigating the publishing processes at the Dutch 
Research and Documentation Centre. They determined 
the following issues that should be taken into account 
when opening up a dataset:  confidentiality, deletion 
policies, embargo placement, cost and time 
consumption, ownership, privacy-sensitivity and 
anonymization, lack of metadata, reuse of data by the 
organization itself, policy-sensitivity and unlawfulness. 
These guidelines could be useful to minimize 
information disclosure of complaints in the NRCT. 
Van den Braak et al. [9] described how judicial data 
can be collected, combined, and analyzed such that the 
privacy of individuals in society is not violated. They 
explained what safety measures have to be taken in the 
process of data integration process to better respect 
privacy laws and regulations, and hence minimize the 
risk of exposing the identity of individuals. 
Parks et al. [20] outline consequences of privacy 
safeguard in the healthcare domain. They focus on how 
privacy-preserving techniques establish a trade-off 
between meeting privacy requirements and the 
execution of healthcare processes. These consequences 
should be carefully considered when proposing 
privacy-preserving techniques for the process of 
registering institutional violence complaints. 
Koops and Leenes [21] discuss practical 
implications of “privacy by design” and the complexity 
of encoding data protection requirements in software. 
This is because of privacy must co-exist with other 
requirements like security, functionality, operational 
efficiency, organizational control, business processes, 
and usability. The authors conclude that “privacy by 
design should be approached less from a ‘code’ 
perspective, but rather from the perspective of 
‘communication’ strategies”. In this regard, there are 
privacy design strategies like the proposed by Deng et 
al. [17], Hoepman [22], Heurix et al. [23], or Hansen et 
al. [24] that consider privacy and data protection 
principles from the beginning of the development 
process.  
The use of workflow management systems 
(WfMSs) could be a benefit for privacy strategies, 
since they could be applied on conceptual process 
models rather than software code, but they entail other 
challenges. In this regards, in [5] authors showed 
weaknesses of WfMSs to capture and enforce privacy 
policies such as conflict of interest, hiding personal 
data, or generalizing data, and provide extensions to 
the YAWL WfMS to cope with such issues. Similarly, 
Mülle et al. [6] and Ciuciu et. al. [3] propose structured 
text annotations in BPMN models to define privacy 
and security aspects related to users. However, none of 
these works explicitly mentions how to identify the 
privacy issues to be modeled. 
In summary, none of these works has discussed 
privacy issues of institutional violence complaints. 
Existing work in the public sector focuses on data 
integration between different organizations, rather than 
on how to identify privacy issues from the inside. On 
the other hand, there are extensions to business process 
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languages to cope with privacy specifications, but there 
is no approach to identify privacy threats from the 
beginning in process models. In this work, we propose 
an approach taking advantage of BPMN for registering 
institutional violence complaints. 
 
3. Procedure for surveying institutional 
violence complaints in Argentina 
 
The Optional Protocol to the United Nation (UN) 
Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT) 
establishes a procedure for visits to all places where 
persons are deprived of their liberty by independent 
international and national monitoring bodies [8]. 
Argentina was the first State in Latin America to ratify 
the OPCAT in 2004. The law for a national system of 
prevention was issued in April 2014 and the selection 
process of the members of the National Committee to 
Prevent Torture is still pending1. 
Besides NRCT, six provinces (Chaco, Mendoza, 
Misiones, Río Negro, Salta, and Tucumán) have 
adopted laws to create local preventive mechanisms to 
implement OPCAT, while others (Santa Fe, Neuquén, 
Corrientes, Córdoba, San Luis, Tierra del Fuego, and 
Buenos Aires) are in the process of debating such laws. 
The Santa Fe province created the Provincial Registry 
of Cases of Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and/or Degrading 
Abuse Police and other affectations Bad Practices and 
Human Rights within the scope of the Provincial 
Public Defense Service (SPPDP).  
 Figure 1 shows the procedure for collecting and 
receiving institutional violence complaints in 
Argentina. This procedure refers to public and open 
access documents such as laws, resolutions, and reports 
of the NRCT and the SPPDP registry. We use the term 
registry to refer to the database that contains 
information about institutional violence complaints in 
the context of the NRCT or the SPPDP registry. There 
are five general use cases for surveying and reporting 
situations of torture in public institutions.  
Referring to the first use case, interviewers visit 
institutions where there are people deprived of liberty 
such as prisons, reformatories, or hospitals. In those 
places, victims are interviewed and fill up the forms to 
report new cases of tortures. Forms are sent to the 
database administrator. People deprived of liberty 
could be in hospitals when they are recovering from a 
disease or if they are under psychiatric treatment. In 
the second use case, complaints of tortures are received 
from witnesses or victims. These complaints are also 
                                                 
1 http://www.apt.ch/en/opcat_pages/opcat-situation-
84/?pdf=info_country 
registered in forms. Then, the forms are sent to the 
database administrator. In the third and fourth use 
cases, complaints are gathered from information 
published on newspapers or from NGOs and other 
organizations. For all of these cases, the database 
administrator registers all of their forms into the 
registry. Referring to the fifth use case, the database 
administrator generates statistical reports for their 
superior to be published to the public on the internet. 
 
 
Figure 1. Use cases for surveying and 
reporting situations of torture 
The form for surveying new cases of institutional 
violence was designed to be applied during inspections 
to places of penitentiary detention and youth custody. 
It is also meant to reconstruct information from 
communications by other institutional channels and 
surveys conducted by other organizations. As for the 
surveys, the interviewer proceeds to complete a form 
for each victim that connects one or more acts of 
torture and/or ill-treatment suffered in the span of the 
last 60 days at the time of the interview. It is assumed 
that paper forms are archived and secure. 
A technical team edits the information recorded in 
confinement places to make it consistent. Then, 
information is entered into the registry as shown in 
Figure 1. Subsequently new analyses are performed to 
process the data statistically and qualitatively for 
preparing annual reports or partial reports. 
According to Figure 1, the registry stores cases of 
abuse and/or torture prosecuted, but also cases reported 
to state agencies, human rights or NGOs. In addition to 
the most widespread modalities, such as physical 
aggressions, the registry considers different types of 
ill-treatments and tortures. 
4043
In the surveys, the form for each victim of acts of 
torture or ill-treatment (Figure 2) includes data about 
the receiving source, the victim and the facts, from a 
written summary and a series of closed and open fields 
to be completed by the interviewer. The information of 
the form is stored in the registry as shown in Figure 1. 
 
4. Privacy threat assessment 
 
In this section, we propose an approach to 
investigate the privacy of the procedure presented in 
Section 3 from a threat modeling perspective.  
When it comes to any information technology, 
privacy and security are at the core of ensuring that 
goals are achieved effectively and without compromise 
of personal data. The three concerns of security are 
confidentiality, integrity and availability. 
Confidentiality means that access to information is 
restricted only to intended parties. Integrity means that 
data is accurate and consistent and has not been 
tampered with, while availability means that resources 
and data remain available when needed by the 
legitimate parties.  
A security background is required for privacy. In 
particular, personally identifiable information is any 
type of information that can be linked to an individual, 
including their activities, preferences, history, 
conversations, etc. Information privacy goals can be 
achieved through privacy preserving mechanisms such 
as access control, privacy policies, and privacy 
preferences.  
Privacy policies describe an organization’s data 
practices. This includes a description of what 
information is collected from users, what the 
information is used for, how long it needs to be held, if 
and how the information should be shared to third 
parties, how long information needs to be retained, etc.  
The user gives consent either implicitly or 
explicitly. Often, consent is implied just by using the 
services. Explicit consent can be given if the user is 
required to click “I agree” in regards to the privacy 
policy terms and conditions to receive services.  
Threat modeling is a useful tool to assess risk 
associated with a system and provides a structured 
approach to security and privacy. Several approaches 
have been developed for threat modeling, one of the 
most widely adapted being Microsoft’s Threat 
Modeling Process [12] and STRIDE model [13] for 
identifying six categories of security threats: Spoofing, 
Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, 
Denial of Service, and Elevation of Privilege. This 
model presents a systematic approach to understanding 
and decomposing an application to identify security 
threats, however there is little focus on privacy.  
 
 
  
Figure 2. The form (translated from Spanish) 
 
To preserve privacy, there must be a foundation of 
security. To achieve this, one must ensure that the 
system, for example in this context, the registry in 
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Figure 1, has a reasonable level of security 
mechanisms in place, and that personal information is 
protected from a security perspective. 
Deng et al. [17] have developed a methodology 
called LINDDUN that provides a comprehensive 
privacy threat modeling framework. Like the STRIDE 
model, LINDDUN identifies privacy threats by using 
similar threat modeling principles (data flow diagrams, 
threat trees and trust boundaries) and mapping them to 
privacy properties based on the terminology defined by 
Pfitzmann et al. [18]. Misuse case scenarios and 
privacy threat tree patterns illustrate privacy attack 
scenarios, which are then prioritized through risk 
assessment techniques. In the final two steps of this 
methodology, mapping the privacy threats to privacy 
requirements allows for the identification of privacy 
enhancing solutions.  
The following privacy threats are the basis of the 
LINDDUN methodology: (1) linkability, an attacker is 
able to distinguish whether two or more items of 
interest (e.g. subjects, messages, actions, etc.) are 
related or not within the system; (2) identifiability, an 
attacker can sufficiently identify a subject associated to 
an item of interest, such as the sender of a message; (3) 
non-repudiation, this allows an attacker to gather 
evidence to counter the claims of the repudiating party 
and to prove that a user knows, has done or has said 
something; (4) detectability, an attacker can distinguish 
whether an item exists or not, e.g. messages are 
sufficiently discernible from random noise; (5) 
information disclosure,  personal information is 
exposed to individuals who are not supposed to have 
access to it; (6) content unawareness, a user is unaware 
of the information disclosed to the system; (7) policy 
and consent noncompliance, this means that even 
though the system shows its privacy policies to its 
users, there is no guarantee that the system actually 
complies to the advertised policies. 
The above threats can be categorized into hard or 
soft privacy threats [17]. Our focus for this paper is on 
soft privacy: information disclosure and content 
awareness. Soft privacy is based on the assumption that 
the data subject is not in control of personal data, and 
must trust the data controllers (service providers). This 
is the domain of policies, access control and audit. In 
this model, the data subject provides personal data and 
the data controller is responsible for it. Policy consent 
and noncompliance is beyond the scope of this paper, 
which assumes that the system (i.e., the registry in 
Figure 1) complies with its privacy policies.   
Based on the above threat modeling techniques, we 
have adapted our own technique appropriate for 
modeling privacy threats in this environment. Below is 
the threat modeling process we cover in the following 
sections, adapted from Microsoft’s Threat Modeling 
Principles [12] and STRIDE Model [13], and the 
LINDDUN methodology [17]. We believe that this 
would provide an effective analysis of privacy threats 
in this procedure. Our approach, illustrated in Figure 3, 
uses a similar process as the three models discussed 
above, with the largest motivation from LINDDUN. 
Starting with an overview of the technical architecture, 
we identify personal data assets and data flow. Next, 
we use the LINDDUN methodology to identify privacy 
threats and threat agents, and illustrate methods of 
attack through threat trees.  
  
 
Figure 3. Threat modeling process 
 
5. Privacy threats in institutional violence 
complaints 
 
In this section, we analyze the law related to 
privacy in institutional violence complaints in 
Argentina, apply the proposed approach, and establish 
a discussion in this context.  
The law related to institutional violence complaints 
consider some aspects related to privacy. However, it 
is not sufficient to protect the privacy of individuals. 
Law 26.827, Article 45 states that the consent of the 
victim to publish their data and personal information in 
reports, media or other ways of making the information 
public is always required [7]. However, the victim may 
not be aware of the consequences of making their data 
public. In this regards, the resolution N° 5 of the 
SPPDP2 (2012, Annex I. 13) states that the interviewer 
should draw the attention of the victim providing 
information about the privacy policy of the Provincial 
Registry, where he can choose “preserving the identity 
of the complainant”. However, this depends on the 
interviewer and the resolution does not guarantee 
identity preservation. 
Law 26.827, Article 47 has to do with preserving 
the identity of victims, and state that disclosure of 
information could place the victim at risk [7]. Related 
to this law, the resolution N° 5 of the SPPDP (2012, 
Annex I. 16) states that any person who is somehow 
involved in the process of collection, referral, 
registration and publication of data shall maintain 
absolute confidentiality in relation to victims and 
preserve all data coming to their knowledge. However, 
these are rather warnings that are not enough to 
preserve identity of victims. 
 
                                                 
2 SPPDP. Resolution 0005. 2012. 
http://www.sppdp.gob.ar/site/normativa/resoluciones/indice/
2012/archivo/Resolucion-0005P-2012.pdf 
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Finally, the resolution N° 5 of the SPPDP (2012, 
Annex I. 19) states that the Deputy Secretary of the 
Provincial Registry shall arbitrate the means to take the 
necessary precautions to make safety records to ensure 
the proper safeguarding of data loaded into the 
Provincial Registry (e.g., backup, compressing, etc.). 
However, Secretary may not be aware of the 
precautions necessary to safeguard victim’s data. 
5.1 Identify privacy threats 
From a policy perspective, any data sharing 
practices that may result in any of the LINDDUN 
threats discussed in Section 4 should be identified in 
the system’s privacy policy. This work depends 
heavily on the assumption that the registry or the 
procedure has published an accurate privacy policy and 
also complies with it.  
For the purpose of this paper, we address the threats 
of information disclosure and content unawareness. 
Information disclosure occurs when a user’s personal 
information is exposed to individuals who are not 
supposed to have access to it. We assume that although 
information disclosure practices are outlined in the 
privacy policy, and the user has provided their consent, 
the user is not actually aware since they do not read or 
understand the policy. Content unawareness occurs 
when the user is unaware of the information that is 
collected on them, such as their personal information.  
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) 
RFC6973 on Privacy Considerations [16] provides 
more specific secondary threats that fall under the 
categories of information disclosure and content 
unawareness. In the proposed model, we attempt to 
prevent the following four categories of threats to 
victims: 
 Surveillance: the observation or monitoring of an 
individual’s communications or activities. The effects 
of surveillance on the individual can range from 
anxiety and discomfort to behavioral changes such as 
inhibition and self-censorship, and even to the 
perpetration of violence against the individual. The 
individual need not be aware of the surveillance so that 
it impacts their privacy – the possibility of surveillance 
may be enough to harm individual autonomy. 
 Secondary use: the use of collected information 
about an individual without the individual's consent for 
a purpose different from that for which the information 
was collected. Secondary use may violate people's 
expectations or desires. The potential for secondary use 
can generate uncertainty on how one's information is 
used in the future, potentially discouraging information 
exchange in the first time.   
 
 
Figure 4. Procedure for surveying institutional violence complaints in BPMN 
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 Disclosure: the revelation of information about an 
individual that affects the way others judge this 
individual. Disclosure can violate individuals' 
expectations of the confidentiality of the data they 
share. The threat of disclosure may deter people from 
engaging in certain activities for fear of reputational 
harm, or simply because they do not wish to be 
observed. 
 Exclusion: the failure to allow individuals to know 
about data that others have about them and to 
participate in its handling and use. Exclusion reduces 
accountability on of entities that maintain information 
about people and creates a sense of vulnerability in 
relation to individuals' ability to control how 
information about them is collected and used. 
 
 
5.2 Mapping privacy threats to Data Flow 
Diagrams 
 
Figure 4 shows the process for investigation of 
torture cases by means of a BPMN model. This model 
corresponds to use case 1 for collecting victim’s data 
described in Figure 1. The process starts when an agent 
receives a case. If the agent cannot interview the 
victim, they must notify the AIDT (Area of 
investigation and documentation of cases of torture) 
and the process ends. Otherwise, the agent interviews 
the victim. After that, if a second interview is needed, 
the agent performs the interview. In parallel, the agent 
notifies whether a criminal complaint is needed. 
Additionally, a healthcare professional performs a 
medical examination in case it is needed, and then 
sends the report to the AIDT. Analogously, a 
psychiatric professional performs an examination and 
then sends the report to the AIDT. Once these activities 
are finished, the agent generates a report, the NRCT 
includes the case in the registry, and the process ends. 
  
Table 1. Mapping BPMN to DFD elements 
Entity User 
Process Investigation of cases of torture 
Data Store Registry 
Data Flow - User data stream (victim to form) 
- Service data stream (form to agent) 
- Registry data stream (agent to database) 
 
Since the privacy threat analysis of LINDDUN 
makes use of Data Flow Diagrams (DFDs) [17], based 
on this process model, Table 1 maps the BPMN model 
elements to DFD elements, whereas Table 2 maps the 
LINDDUN privacy threats to DFD element types (E: 
Entity, DF: data flow, DS: data store, P: process). 
The threat of information disclosure occurs at the 
process, data store and data flow levels. This falls into 
the control of the registry, which outlines information 
disclosure practices in their privacy policy. While we 
assume that the registry has accurate policies as well as 
complies with them, the threat we are concerned with 
is related to the entity who agrees to disclose the 
information.  
Content unawareness is a threat to the entity (user). 
The user is required to provide the necessary consent to 
process personal data. The goal of our model is to 
address the threats of content unawareness from the 
perspective of the user, putting them in control of 
information disclosure. This model addresses 
information disclosure from the entity’s perspective 
who complies with information disclosure practices. 
This model is acting under the assumption that all the 
process, data store and data flow elements act in 
compliance with their policies and the consent of the 
victim. 
 
Table 2. Mapping privacy threats to DFD 
elements 
Threat 
Categories 
Entity Process Data 
Store 
Data 
Flow 
Linkability N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Identifiability N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Non-repudiation  N/A N/A N/A 
Detectability  N/A N/A N/A 
Information 
Disclosure 
T A A A 
Content 
Unawareness 
T    
Policy/Consent 
Noncompliance 
 A A A 
Legend: N/A=Not Applicable (Out of scope), T=Threats addressed, 
A=Assumed to Comply 
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5.3 Methods of attack 
 
In this section, we observe the different methods 
an adversary can use to reach the data. First, we 
examine privacy threats based on Table 2 in order to 
determine privacy threat trees. Next, we create 
misuse case scenarios based on the threat tree 
patterns and propose privacy requirements and 
controls to mitigate these threats.  
 
5.3.1 Privacy threat tree for information disclosure 
 
Figure 5 refers to the privacy threat tree for 
information disclosure. For the purpose of this work, 
we are referring to intentional information disclosure, 
which is predefined by the registry and outlined in 
the privacy policy, rather than information disclosure 
as a result of security exploits. Personal information 
may be disclosed to other users or to a third party. 
The threats related to sharing a victim’s personal data 
can lead to undesirable inferences of the victim’s 
behavior and personal life. A victim’s personal data 
sent to a third party can be used for customer 
profiling of the victim. Sharing personal data with 
other users puts the physical safety of the victim at 
risk if it is shared with an untrusted entity. For these 
reasons, a victim may choose not to consent to 
sharing their personal data depending on privacy 
policy practices.  
 
Figure 5. Information disclosure privacy 
threat tree 
5.3.2 Privacy threat tree for content unawareness  
 
Figure 6 refers to the privacy threat tree for 
content unawareness. Content unawareness occurs at 
the victim level when the victim provides more 
personal data than is required or does not read the 
privacy policies. Providing too much personal data is 
unnecessary and opens up opportunities for further 
undesirable inferences. There is also the possibility 
that a victim does not read the privacy policies and 
therefore is unaware that certain aspects of their 
personal data is being collected and shared. The 
victims may be unaware of the purpose for which 
their personal data is collected, or how it is used. The 
victims may neither be aware that their personal 
information is being collected nor their personal data 
is being shared with third parties. All these situations 
can result in information disclosure to which the user 
has unwittingly provided their consent. 
 
Figure 6. Content unawareness privacy 
threat tree 
5.3.3 Misuse case scenarios. 
 
In this section, we provide a misuse case scenario 
of victim’s personal information based on the threat 
tree patterns. The misuse case model is based on the 
LINDDUN model. The threat trees in Figures 5 and 6 
indicate that to be susceptible to the threat of content 
awareness, the victim either unknowingly provides 
too much personal data or does not read privacy 
policies. For information disclosure, the registry 
forwards the data to a third party or another agent. 
These are the preconditions of the misuse case. To 
create the attack scenario, the attacker first needs to 
have access to the registry (data store), and either the 
victim (data subject) can be re-identified or the 
pseudonyms can be linkable. In this scenario, the 
actions of the misusing actor are actually completely 
legitimate as outlined in their privacy policy. 
However, the data use/sharing practices do not 
comply with the victim’s expectations or legislation.  
Although law 26.827, Article 45, states that the 
consent of the victim to publish their data and 
personal information is always required [7], the 
victim may not be aware of the consequences of 
making its data public or could not understood the 
privacy policies. The attack case scenario is 
presented below. 
 
Title: Misuse Case 1, Content Unawareness and Information 
Disclosure 
Summary: victim unknowingly provides personal data to the agent 
Assets, stakeholders and threats: victim’s personal information. 
The victims are unaware the information is collected and sent.  
Potential threats: surveillance, secondary use, disclosure, 
exclusion 
Primary misusing actor: victim for not reading privacy policy. 
Basic flow:  
Victim consents to privacy policy without reading it. 
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Victim unknowingly sends personal information to the agent. 
Alternative flow: Same as the above except that the agent sends 
victim’s personal information to a third party for other purposes. 
Trigger: Victim does not read the privacy policy that outlines the 
agent’s privacy practices. 
Preconditions:  
Victim provides consent but has not read or understood the 
privacy policies. 
Victims have some sort of expectation for privacy, which does 
not actually correlate with the privacy policy or the data 
sharing practices of the agent. 
 
5.3.4 Privacy requirements/controls. 
 
Based on the above analysis of threats and 
illustrative attack scenario, we now propose some 
privacy requirements and controls needed to mitigate 
these threats. The IETF outlines in their privacy 
considerations [16] two major mitigation techniques 
to deter threats of surveillance, disclosure, secondary 
use and exclusion. Techniques are data minimization 
and user participation: 
 Data minimization: limiting collection, use, 
disclosure, retention, identifiability, sensitivity, and 
access to personal data to the minimal amount 
necessary to perform a task. Reducing the amount of 
data exchanged reduces the amount of data that can 
be misused. Data minimization mitigates the threats 
of surveillance, secondary use and disclosure. 
 User participation: data collection and use that 
happens “in secret,” without the individual’s 
knowledge, is apt to violate the individual’s 
expectation of privacy and may create incentives for 
misuse of data. As a result, privacy regimes tend to 
include provisions to support informing individuals 
about data collection and use and involving them in 
decisions about the treatment of their data. In an 
engineering context, supporting the goal of user 
participation usually means providing ways for users 
to control the data that is shared about them. It may 
also mean providing ways for users to signal how 
they expect their data to be used and shared. User 
participation mitigates the threats of surveillance, 
secondary use, disclosure and exclusion. 
Our threat model illustrates that the privacy 
requirements are data minimization and user 
participation, in order to mitigate the threats of 
information disclosure and content unawareness, 
which can lead to surveillance, disclosure, secondary 
use and exclusion. Privacy controls, which achieve 
the goals of data minimization and user participation, 
include implementing a privacy access control model.  
 
6. Conclusion and future work  
 
In this work, we proposed an approach to 
investigate the privacy of institutional violence 
complaints in Argentina. The approach was adapted 
from existing security and privacy methodologies. 
Starting with an overview of the technical 
architecture, we defined a BPMN process model for 
registering victims’ complaints in a database. This 
allowed us to identify personal data assets and data 
flow. Next, we used the LINDDUN methodology to 
identify privacy threats and threat agents, and 
illustrated methods of attack through threat trees. 
This allowed us observing different methods an 
attacker can use to reach the data and creating misuse 
case scenarios based on the threat tree patterns. 
For the purpose of this paper, we addressed the 
threats of information disclosure and content 
unawareness in relation to an individual’s privacy 
when reporting instances of institutional violence. 
Aiming to minimize these threats, the identified 
privacy requirements for the proposed process are 
data minimization and user participation, which can 
lead to surveillance, disclosure, secondary use and 
exclusion.  
For user participation, it is part of future work to 
study how to make sure that individuals understand 
the policy and in which way they could control their 
own data. Future work is also concerned with 
analyzing other threat categories such as linkability, 
identifiability, non-repudiation and detectability. We 
also plan to implement this process for surveying 
institutional violence complaints in a business 
process management system taking into account the 
identified privacy threats and requirements. 
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